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IN IMPARTIALITY WE TRUST: 
A COMMENTARY ON GOVERNMENT AID 
AND INVOLVEMENT WITH RELIGION 
 
THOMAS J. CLEARY* 
 
[S]ay nothing of my religion. It is known to my 
God and myself alone. Its evidence before the 
world is to be sought in my life; if that has been 
honest and dutiful to society, the religion which 
has regulated it cannot be a bad one.
1
 
 -Thomas Jefferson 
 
I.        INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 overnment neutrality towards religion was not intended 
by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, is not mandated by 
the First Amendment, and, strictly speaking, is not possible. 
Despite this, there has been a significant trend in the law 
towards establishing “neutrality” as the benchmark for proper 
government interaction with religion. In fact, many view the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment [hereinafter “Religion Clauses”] as erecting an 
impenetrable wall that separates government and religion. 
This is incorrect, however, as the Religion Clauses stipulate 
only that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”2 Notably, the wall metaphor and the neutrality ideal 
                                                 
*
 Thomas J. Cleary is an Attorney and Adjunct Faculty Member at 
the Southern New England School of Law. The author is also a 2007 
graduate and valedictorian of the Southern New England School of Law 
and a 2004 graduate of Hiram College. The author wishes to thank 
Professors Frances Rudko and Dwight Duncan and editors Keri Garcia 
and Amanda Cooper for their insightful suggestions.   
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Jan. 11, 1817), in 
THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS, at 506 (Lester J. Cappon, ed., 1959) 
(emphasis added).  
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
G
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are not referenced anywhere in the United States Constitution 
[hereinafter “Constitution”]. This is consistent with the fact 
that such an approach was not intended or implemented by 
the Framers.  
In order to understand the neutrality ideal it is necessary 
to understand its evolution. In developing this understanding 
it is important to consider the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century “tolerance movement” and the development of 
religious liberty in the United States.3 This involves 
considering the views of James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson. Also, the wall metaphor will be explored as its 
infusion into the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court [hereinafter “Supreme Court”] has produced a 
tumultuous and unstable area of law. This infusion has 
distorted the Religion Clauses and is the primary impediment 
to true religious freedom in the United States. Indeed, the 
unfortunate consequences of this infusion give new meaning 
to Justice Cardozo’s warning that “[m]etaphors in law are to 
be narrowly watched, for starting [as] devices to liberate 
thought, they end often by enslaving it.”4  
In the context of the Religion Clauses, true neutrality 
requires not only impartiality and the absence of bias but also 
noninvolvement and general disinterest in religion. First, true 
neutrality is not possible because actual impartiality is not 
possible. Second, true neutrality is not possible because 
government and religion share a natural connection, which 
precludes noninvolvement and discourages disinterest. The 
connection existing between government and religion in 
society ensures that there must be a substantial degree of 
interaction between the two.  
With a fresh memory of religious tyranny in Europe, it is 
not surprising that many of the colonists were eager to secure 
religious liberty after the Revolutionary War. The premiere 
importance of religious liberty is alluded to by the fact that 
the first sixteen words of the First Amendment to the 
                                                 
3 Throughout this text, “tolerance movement” refers to the gradual 
acceptance in popular sentiment of government tolerance of religious 
pluralism. 
4 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). 
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Constitution were dedicated to establishing such security. 
These sixteen words proscribe government establishment of 
religion and prescribe the right of all citizens to freely 
exercise their religion. The debates of the First Congress on 
the proposed religion amendment, however, do not indicate a 
desire to foster government neutrality towards religion and 
irreligion. Rather, the debates strongly indicate that the First 
Amendment was not intended to mandate such neutrality. 
This interpretation is bolstered by the abundant examples in 
early America of direct government aid to and involvement 
with religion.   
Ultimately, because true neutrality is not possible, nearly 
all government interaction with religion is to some degree 
friendly or hostile. One could argue, therefore, that 
government interaction with religion is inherently friendly or 
hostile in nature. As a consequence, establishing neutrality as 
the ideal misses the mark and has produced a swinging 
pendulum in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. At one end 
of its arc the pendulum produces hostility towards religion 
and at the other end of the arc it produces friendliness 
towards religion. This is reflected in case law and in both 
early and modern government practices. Ultimately, the 
pendulum phenomenon must be brought to an end as it 
undermines uniformity, judicial economy, and societal 
stability.  
Because government interaction with religion is generally 
friendly or hostile in nature, the question then becomes 
whether to adopt a friendly or hostile approach. Of the two, 
for a myriad of reasons, it is better to adopt a friendly 
approach. Nonpreferentialism represents the ideal friendly 
approach.5 This is true for four reasons. First, 
nonpreferentialism does not require neutrality between 
religion and irreligion, which is more aligned with the 
original understanding of the Religion Clauses.6 Second, it is 
                                                 
5 Nonpreferentialism is the view that government may not prefer one 
religion to another religion but may support religion in general.  See 
discussion infra Section V, subsection A. 
6 This is true, as it appears that these clauses were originally intended 
to prevent the national government from endorsing a particular religious 
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more consistent with the text of the Religion Clauses as the 
clauses themselves do not mandate government neutrality 
towards religion. Third, it would allow for nonpreferential aid 
to religious institutions, which perform many important social 
services. Finally, as Alexis de Tocqueville indicates, religion 
encourages morality. It is prudent to adopt a friendly 
approach, therefore, because such encouragement is key in 
producing government stability and longevity. 
 
II.        THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL 
NEUTRALITY TOWARDS RELIGION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
This section will examine the sentiments of John Locke7 
and Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu8 
[hereinafter “Montesquieu”] regarding religious tolerance and 
will provide context to the tolerance movement and the 
evolution of religious freedom in America. Specific attention 
will be given to the views of James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson. A brief summary and review of the struggle for 
religious freedom in Virginia follows. Next, the genesis of 
the phrase “a wall of separation between church and state” 
will be examined. Finally, judicial adoption of this phrase 
will be considered together with the resulting impact on the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.      
                                                                                                     
sect or establishing a national church or religion. See discussion infra 
Section III, subsection A. 
7 John Locke (1632 – 1704) was an English political philosopher. Of 
particular note, in his “Second Treatise of Government,” Locke proposed 
that a government was truly legitimate only when it protected the natural 
rights of life, liberty, and estate and when its governance was based on the 
consent of the governed. In his “Second Treatise of Government” Locke 
also argued that those governed without their consent had a right to 
rebellion.  See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 
(Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1952) (1690).  
8 Montesquieu (1689 – 1755) was a Frenchman widely regarded for 
his political philosophy. He argued that the essential functions of 
government could be divided into three categories: legislative, executive, 
and judicial. He argued that these three functions of government should 
be isolated from one another to prevent the consolidation and corruption 
of government power. 




A. Locke, Montesquieu, and the Tolerance 
Movement 
 
The Framers were true products of the Enlightenment 
Era. They were well educated.9 They were well read in terms 
of both classic and modern political philosophy.10 Indeed, 
many of the Framers were great political thinkers in their own 
right. There is no better testament to this fact than that 
document which sets forth the organic scaffolding for our 
unique system of government—the Constitution.  
The Constitution was formulated to produce a system of 
government that would last throughout the ages. While many 
aspects of the Constitution are novel and owe their genesis to 
the minds of the Framers, it is important to keep in mind that 
the Framers were heavily influenced by Enlightenment 
political philosophy. The Enlightenment brought about a 
revolution in systematic rationality. The era is characterized, 
in part, by a resurgence and infusion of systematic thought, 
which produced principled and well-reasoned treatises on 
government.  
In particular, many Enlightenment philosophers 
considered the relationship between government and 
religion.11 This issue was considered by Locke in A Letter 
Concerning Toleration
12 and by Montesquieu in The Spirit of 
Laws.13 These important and influential works provide 
context to the development of religious liberty in America. 
                                                 
9 See generally M.E. BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS: BRIEF LIVES 
OF THE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (University Press 
of Kansas 1994) (1981) (detailing the educational backgrounds of the 
individual Framers and concluding that they were highly educated). 
10 Id. 
11 Implicit in this notion is the idea that a relationship must exist 
between government and religion. 
12 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Prometheus 
Books 1990) (1689). 
13 CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
LAWS (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, & Harold Stone, trans., 
Prometheus Books 2002) (1748) (Originally published in French as “De 
l'Esprit des Lois”). 
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American religious liberty was born out of the tolerance 
movement, which these works helped to produce.     
The influence of Locke is heavily reflected in the 
Declaration of Independence14 and is well documented in the 
contentious colonial debates concerning ratification of the 
Constitution.15 Locke’s treatise on toleration “became a bible 
to many in the eighteenth century, who were still contending 
against the old theories of religious uniformity.”16 In A Letter 
Concerning Toleration, Locke examines the relationship 
between religion and government. Locke argues that above 
all things it is necessary to “distinguish exactly the business 
of civil government from that of religion.”17 Locke argues 
that government does not naturally have the authority to 
compel the acceptance of particular religious beliefs and that 
such authority cannot be granted to it by consent of the 
people as “no man can so far abandon the care of his own 
salvation as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other.”18 
Overall, Locke strongly advocates government tolerance of 
religious beliefs.19 While he attributes much civil unrest to 
religious intolerance and the use of force to compel religious 
belief, Locke does not advocate neutrality towards religion. 
                                                 
14 This is true both in its formal recital of life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness as inalienable rights and more broadly by the encapsulated 
notion that those governed without their consent have a right to rebellion.  
See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
15 See Arthur Lee, Reply to Wilson’s Speech: ‘Cincinnatus’ V, in 1 
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, 114, 119 (Bernard 
Bailyn, ed., 1993) (In the New York Journal on Nov. 29, 1787 Arthur Lee 
admonishes his partner in debate for not having read Locke.); See also 
Cato III, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, supra at 
214, 216 (article discussing Locke’s theories of government and the 
necessity of securing life, liberty, and estate that was originally published 
in the New York Journal on Oct. 25, 1787).   
16 Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel02.html (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2006). 
17 LOCKE, supra note 12, at 18.  
18 Id. at 19. 
19 Id. at 19. 
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Rather, he strongly advocates the use of rational persuasion to 
encourage religious morality.20  
The influence of Montesquieu on the Framers is clear as 
“[e]ven a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the 
influence of Montesquieu’s thesis.”21 In his Spirit of 
Governments article printed in the National Gazette on 
February 20, 1792, Madison himself described the works of 
Montesquieu as having “lifted the veil from the venerable 
errors which enslaved opinion, and pointed the way to those 
luminous truths of which he had but a glimpse himself.”22 In 
The Spirit of Laws Montesquieu performs a careful 
examination of the connection between government, religion, 
and morality. In this treatise Montesquieu advocates religious 
tolerance but distinguishes between tolerating and approving 
a religion.23 Based on this distinction Montesquieu finds it is 
necessary for civil laws to prevent religions from 
“embroiling” the state and from causing disturbances 
amongst themselves.24 Montesquieu urges that “[h]uman 
laws, made to direct the will, ought to give precepts, and not 
counsels; religion, made to influence the heart, should give 
many counsels, and few precepts.”25  
Montesquieu, however, does not advocate government 
neutrality towards religion. Rather, he thinks that religion has 
helped to tame government tyranny and proclaims “we owe 
to Christianity, in government, a certain political law…[as it 
represents] a benefit which human nature can never 
sufficiently acknowledge.”26 For instance, he observes that 
                                                 
20 Id. at 20.   
21 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986). See, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (on the separation of powers). In 
addition, the “celebrated” Montesquieu was referenced explicitly during 
the debates on the constitutional convention of 1787 and during the 
colonial debates surrounding ratification of the Constitution.    
22 JAMES MADISON, Spirit of Governments, NAT’L GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 
1792 reprinted in JAMES MADISON WRITINGS, 509, 510 (Jack N. Rakove, 
ed., The Library of America 1999) (1792). 
23 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 13, at 51-52.  
24 Id. at 52.  
25 Id. at 32. 
26 Id. at 29.  
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religion has influenced princes to display greater humanity 
and self-control and rendered them more likely to be directed 
by laws.27 Montesquieu states “the Christian religion, which 
ordains that men should love each other, would, without 
doubt, have every nation blest with the best civil law, the best 
political laws; because these, next to this religion, are the 
greatest good that men can give and receive.”28 For these 
reasons Montesquieu advocates government tolerance of 
religious beliefs. It is also important to note that Montesquieu 
rejects the notion that all religions benefit government.29 
Overall, it appears unlikely that the Framers would have seen 
Montesquieu as advocating either a complete separation of 
religion from government or establishing absolute neutrality 
as the ideal relationship between the two.    
In short, Locke and Montesquieu significantly influenced 
the Framers. In religion, this influence is most clearly 
reflected in the tolerance movement that spread throughout 
America during the late eighteenth century. The tolerance 
movement planted the seed for what would later become the 
unique notion of religious liberty and independence in 
America. As discussed below, this movement did not 
necessarily embrace government neutrality towards religion.   
 
B. The Evolution of Religious Liberty in Colonial 
America 
 
American colonization was fueled by a desire to escape 
religious persecution in Europe. Interestingly, many think 
that the Pilgrims came to America because the Pilgrims 
wanted freedom for everyone to practice different religions. 
This common misconception is patently false. Rather, the 
Pilgrims came to America because they wanted everyone to 
have the freedom to practice the Pilgrims’ religious beliefs. 
Thus, it is not surprising that religious intolerance and 
                                                 
27 Id. at 29.  
28 Id. at 27. 
29 See id. at 30 (arguing that while we ought to embrace Christianity, 
we ought to reject “Mahommedan religions” as they have a destructive 
influence).   
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persecution is legion throughout the historical record of both 
Europe and colonial America. As Thomas Jefferson observed 
in his Notes on the State of Virginia, the first settlers to 
Virginia became possessed “of the powers of making, 
administering, and executing laws, [which] showed equal 
intolerance in this country with their Presbyterian brethren, 
who had emigrated to the northern government.”30 Therefore, 
as the accounts of settlers such as Roger Williams and Anne 
Hutchinson illustrate, religious hostility predates religious 
tolerance in America.31 
Religious tolerance in America can be traced to the 
colonies in Maryland, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
and Carolina. “These colonies, though established as 
sanctuaries for particular groups of religious dissenters, 
extended freedom of religion to groups—although often 
limited to Christian groups—beyond their own.”32 
Throughout the mid-seventeenth century these colonies 
expressly provided for free exercise of the Christian religion. 
While this is far from true religious tolerance, it is certainly a 
step in that direction. For instance, in 1649 with its Act 
Concerning Religion, the Maryland Assembly enacted the 
first “free exercise” law.33 Rhode Island’s Charter of 1663 
went even further by protecting “residents from being ‘in any 
ways molested, punished, disquieted, or called into question, 
for any differences in opinion, in matters of religion, [which] 
do not actually disturb the civil peace of our said colony.’”34 
The tolerance movement spread rapidly and by 1789 “every 
State but Connecticut had incorporated some version of a free 
                                                 
30 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 150 
(Harper & Row 1964). 
31 During the seventeenth century both Williams and Hutchinson 
were banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony due essentially to 
religious intolerance.  
32 Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 551 (1997) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  
33 Id. The Maryland Act Concerning Religion provided “[n]o person . 
. . professing to believe in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth be any ways 
troubled, Molested or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her 
religion nor in the free exercise thereof.” Id.  
34 Id. (quoting Rhode Island Charter of 1663). 
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exercise clause into its constitution.”35 As such, the tolerance 
movement played an essential role in developing religious 
liberty in America.     
The principal advocates of religious liberty in America 
were James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The positions 
advocated by Madison and Jefferson represents what can be 
properly characterized as an apex in colonial sentiment with 
regard to religious freedom. It is from the shadowy regions of 
this apex that the neutrality ideal would later emerge. 
Madison believed that danger resulted from “a direct mixture 
of Religion & civil Government,”36 and he argued that there 
is “not a shadow of right in the general government to 
intermeddle with religion.”37 Madison believed such 
intermeddling “would be a most flagrant usurpation.”38 
Further, both men share the notion that religion and 
government “will both exist in greater purity, the less they are 
mixed together.”39 While this is not a per se endorsement of 
neutrality, it is surely a step in that general direction.  
Both Madison and Jefferson played a fundamental role in 
championing religious liberty in Virginia. Although Virginia 
                                                 
35  Id. at 553. 
36 JAMES MADISON, Detached Memoranda, in JAMES MADISON 
WRITINGS, supra note 22 at 510  (emphasis added). Qualifying the 
mixture as being “direct” seemingly implies either that there either may 
not be such a danger with an indirect mixture of government and religion 
or that while there may be some danger that an indirect mixture is 
unavoidable and therefore not worthy of comment.       
37 JAMES MADISON, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention on 
Taxation, a Bill of Rights, and the Mississippi, in JAMES MADISON 
WRITINGS, supra note 22 at 382 (emphasis added) (Madison’s use of the 
word “general” in qualifying government likely refers to the federal 
government. This of course indicates that there is a corresponding state 
right to “intermeddle with religion.”). 
38 Id. In keeping with this is the indication that general government 
intermeddling would represent usurpation—seemingly of state authority. 
Further support for this interpretation is gained from the fact that Madison 
articulated essentially this same argument during the First Congress’s 
debates on the religion amendment.       
39 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1882), 
in JAMES MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 22 at 789 (The 1786 Act for 
Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia, written by Jefferson, appears 
to strongly support this notion).  
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provided for free exercise of religion and had disestablished 
the Church of England in 1776, it did not prohibit the support 
of Christianity by generally assessed taxes.40 Jefferson 
opposed such taxes and drafted a bill to establish greater 
religious freedom in Virginia.41 Jefferson’s bill was addressed 
and debated in the General Assembly in 1779 but was not 
adopted.42 A majority of the Virginia General Assembly 
clearly rejected Jefferson’s radical views on religious liberty.     
Consequently, on December 24, 1784, Virginia 
Congressman Patrick Henry “introduced ‘A Bill Establishing 
a Provision for the Teachers of the Christian Religion,’ which 
proposed that citizens be taxed in order to support the 
Christian denomination of their choice, with those taxes not 
designated for any specific denomination to go to a public 
fund to aid seminaries.”43 This proposal generated great 
controversy.44 In light of this controversy, the Virginia 
General Assembly voted to postpone consideration of the 
religious assessment bill until the next legislative session.45  
In response to Patrick Henry’s proposed bill, a Baptist’s 
petition circulated opposing religious assessments on 
November 17, 1785.46 Madison, however, led the chief 
opposition to the religious assessment bill. Madison wrote the 
                                                 
40 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 560 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); See generally, 
JEFFERSON, supra note 30 at 150-51; See also, the 1776 Amendments to 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which stipulated that “it is the mutual 
duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards 
each other.” JAMES MADISON, Amendments to the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights, in JAMES MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 22 at 10 (emphasis 
added).   
41 Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel05.html (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2006). 
42 Id. 
43 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 560 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
44 This is well exemplified by the move to postpone voting on the 
religious assessment bill so as to bolster support in opposition of it. See, 
Library of Congress Exhibition, supra note 41. 
45 Madison led the move to postpone the bill. Id. Notably, future 
Chief Justice John Marshall was among those who voted for the tax 
assessment and against postponing the bill. Id. 
46 Id.   
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Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
which pragmatically detailed and delineated fifteen separate 
points in opposition to Henry’s proposed bill. Ultimately, 
Madison’s petition grounded his objection to Henry’s bill on 
the belief that it violated an “unalienable” natural right to 
freedom of religion.47 When the General Assembly of 
Virginia revisited the issue in 1785, not only was Madison 
able to defeat the proposed bill, but also in January 1786, he 
was able to secure passage of Jefferson’s “Act for 
Establishing Religious Freedom.”48 While Jefferson’s Act fell 
short of mandating government neutrality towards religion, 
proponents of religious liberty viewed passage of this Act as 
a great victory. The passage represented a concrete shift from 
mere tolerance to the establishment of religious freedom as a 
natural and inalienable right. More specifically, the Act 
proclaimed: 
 
Well aware that Almighty God hath created the 
mind free…it [is] therefore enacted by the 
General Assembly, That no man shall be 
compelled to frequent or support any religious 
worship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall 
be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened 
in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer 
on account of his religious opinion or beliefs’ 
but that all men shall be free to profess, and by 
argument to maintain, their opinions in matters 
of religion, and that the same shall in nowise 
diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil 
capacities…[T]o declare this act irrevocable, 
would be of no effect in law, yet we are free to 
declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby 
asserted are of the natural rights of mankind, 
and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to 
repeal the present or to narrow its operation, 
                                                 
47 Id.   
48 Id. 
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such act will be an infringement of natural 
right.49   
 
It is also important to briefly consider Madison’s Notes of 
Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. The majority of 
Madison’s Constitutional Convention notes referencing 
religion are inconsistent with a strict separation approach.50 
Indeed, most can be accurately characterized as antithetical to 
the neutrality ideal. Still, there are a few passages that 
advocate for some degree of separation between the two. For 
instance, on June 6, 1787, Madison cautions that “[r]eligion 
itself may become a motive to persecution and oppression—
[t]hese observations are verified by the Histories of every 
Country ancient [and] modern.”51 In addition, on August 30, 
1787, Mr. Charles Pinkney successfully moved to add to 
Article VI of the Constitution that “no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under 
the authority of the U[nited] States.”52 
Finally, Madison’s notes indicate that on September 14, 
1787 he and Mr. Pinkney moved to list the establishment of 
“an University, in which no preferences or distinctions should 
be allowed on account of Religion” as a vested right of 
Congress.53 The motion ultimately was defeated as six states 
voted against adoption and only 4 states voted in support of 
it.54 Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina voted in support of the motion. New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and 
Georgia voted against the motion.55 Connecticut was divided 
                                                 
49 JEFFERSON, supra note 30, at 206-08. 
50 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, 209-11 (W.W. Norton & Company 1987) (1920) 
(detailing Benjamin Franklin’s proposed prayer during the Constitutional 
Convention).  
51 Id. at 76. 
52 Id. at 561 (All states voted to approve this language except 
Maryland, which was divided on the issue, and North Carolina, which 
voted against the motion.).  
53 Id. at 639. 
54 Id. at 639.  
55 Id. at 639. 
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on the issue.56 While Madison’s notes do not reveal why the 
states opposed it, it is likely that they opposed for religious 
considerations. The neutrality ideal is also undermined by the 
fact that Ben Franklin successfully called to open each day of 
the Constitutional Convention with prayer on June 28, 
1787.57  
 
C. Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation 
 
Thomas Jefferson was an influential figure in America 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As 
the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, the 
third President of the United States, and a champion of 
religious tolerance and liberty, Jefferson’s views on religious 
liberty are reflected not only in his Act for Establishing 
Religious Freedom in Virginia but also in his professional 
and personal correspondence and his book, Notes on the State 
of Virginia [hereinafter “Notes”].  
Jefferson recited in his Notes that freedom of conscience 
is a natural right.58 Jefferson reasons that our government 
only has authority over the natural rights that we submit to 
them and that we have not, nor could we ever, submit to the 
government our rights of conscience.59 Jefferson 
contemplates that the “legitimate powers of government 
extend only to such acts as are injurious to others.”60 With 
characteristic eloquence, Jefferson states, “it does me no 
injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no 
God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”61  
Throughout his life Jefferson was an advocate of church 
and state separation.62 Historian Leonard Levy remarked this 
                                                 
56 Id. at 639. 
57 Id. at 209-11. 
58 JEFFERSON, supra note 30, at 152. This sentiment is also reflected 
in the above quoted passage from Jefferson’s 1786 Act for Establishing 




62 LEONARD LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER 
SIDE, 8 (Harvard University Press 1963). 
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was a position that Jefferson clearly defined, publicly stated, 
and vigorously defended.63 From his extensive research on 
Jefferson, Levy concluded “[a]lthough it exposed him to 
abusive criticism he carried on his fight for separation of 
church and state, and for the free exercise of religion, 
throughout his long public career without significant 
contradictions.”64 This is well exemplified by Jefferson’s 
recorded correspondence.  
For example, in his January 23, 1808 letter to Rev. 
Samuel Miller, Jefferson explains his reluctance as President 
to continue the tradition of his predecessors and recommend a 
day of fasting and prayer.65 This supports Jefferson’s thought 
that even indirect government involvement with religion 
ought to be avoided. Yet the prudence of such an approach is 
seemingly called into question by Jefferson’s own rhetorical 
assertion that “the liberties of a nation [cannot] be thought 
secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a 
conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are 
of the gift of God.”66 Still, Jefferson opines that simply 
recommending a religious observance would be to “indirectly 
assume to the U.S. an authority over religious exercises 
which the Constitution has directly precluded them from.”67 
Jefferson noted that the religious recommendations of his 
predecessors were made without due consideration of the 
general government’s authority and that the right to make 
such representations rested only in the state governments.68 
                                                 
63 Id. at 15. 
64 Id. at 15. 
65 University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center, Thomas 
Jefferson 1743-1826 Letters http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public 
(Last visited Nov. 15, 2006). 
66 JEFFERSON, supra note 30, at 156.  
67 Id. 
68 Id. While this is true, it is notable that Jefferson nevertheless did 
have some involvement with religion. See e.g. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 447 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). On March 4, 1805, President 
Jefferson proclaimed: 
I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands 
we are, who led our fathers, as Israel of old…and to 
whose goodness I ask you to join in supplications with 
me that He will so enlighten the minds of your servants, 
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This reflects the general understanding of our federalism as 
representing a system of dual sovereignties and is 
inconsistent with the neutrality ideal.  Seemingly if the power 
to aid religion was reserved to the states, the First 
Amendment did not mandate neutrality. 
The quintessential representation of Jefferson’s opinion 
regarding church and state involvement is contained in his 
1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association.69 Jefferson 
wrote that the language contained in the Religion Clauses 
built “a wall of separation between church and state.”70 
Notably, the wall metaphor was first used by Roger Williams, 
who advocated for a “hedge or wall of separation between the 
garden of the church and the wilderness of the world.”71 
While the wall metaphor may be representative of Jefferson’s 
personal view on the matter, it is doubtful it authoritatively 
illustrates the First Congress’s intent in formulating the 
Religion Clauses. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist persistently 
                                                                                                     
guide their councils, and prosper their measures that 
whatsoever they do shall result in your good, and shall 
secure to you the peace, friendship, and approbation of 
all nations.   Id. 
69 Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/f0605as.jpg  
(last visited Nov. 15, 2006) (Jefferson’s letter was written in response to a 
congratulatory letter he received from the Danbury Baptist Association). 
70 Id. The Library of Congress extends thanks to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation Laboratory, specifically: 
[F]or recovering the lines obliterated from the [original] 
Danbury Baptist letter by Thomas Jefferson. He 
originally wrote “a wall of eternal separation between 
church and state,” later deleting the word “eternal”…[as 
he] must have been unhappy with the uncompromising 
tone of [the phrase], especially in view of the 
implications of his decision, two days later, to begin 
attending church services in the House of 
Representatives.  
Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel06-2.html 
(last visited November 15, 2006). 
71 Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and 
Answered, in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, 108 
(1644). 
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questioned Jefferson’s status as an “ideal source of 
contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion 
Clauses.”72 Justice Rehnquist observed that Jefferson was “of 
course in France at the time…the Bill of Rights were debated 
by Congress and ratified by the States,” and Jefferson’s 
“letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of 
courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed 
by Congress.”73 As such, the prudence of treating the wall 
metaphor as representative of the intended effect of the 
Religion Clauses is questionable at best.      
Notwithstanding, in Everson v. Board of Education74, 
Justice Black wrote for the majority stating, “[t]he First 
Amendment has erected a wall between church and 
state…[and that] wall must be kept high and 
impregnable…[because we] could not approve the slightest 
breach.”75 Justice Black, in holding that a State may provide 
funds to bus children to and from parochial schools, 
supported this assertion by positing that the First Amendment 
mandated government neutrality toward religion.76 Justice 
Rutledge dissented from the Supreme Court’s decision. He 
argued that the decision was inconsistent with perfect 
neutrality toward religion, which he believed was mandated 
by the First Amendment.77 More specifically, Rutledge states, 
“the object [of the Religion Clauses] was broader than 
separating church and state in [the] narrow sense…[rather the 
object] was to create a complete and permanent separation of 
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by 
                                                 
72 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
73 Id.  
74 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
75 Id. at 18. The Supreme Court’s first use of Jefferson’s Wall phrase 
involved the assertion that “[i]n the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of 
separation between church and State.’” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 164 (1879) (quoting Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists).  
76 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
77 Id. at 31-39. 
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comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or 
support for religion.”78  
The Eversonian notion that the Religion Clauses were 
intended to create a wall of separation, mandating 
government neutrality towards religion, has significantly 
influenced the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. All members 
of the Supreme Court, however, have not accepted this 
interpretation. In fact, the Rehnquist Court mounted 
considerable opposition to this belief.79 Ultimately, the 
inherent ambiguity of the Religion Clauses, together with the 
controversy surrounding the Eversonian interpretation, has 
led to a tumultuous and internally inconsistent body of 
jurisprudence.  
 
III.        THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT MANDATE 
NEUTRALITY TOWARDS RELIGION NOR HAS THE 
GOVERNMENT ADOPTED IT IN PRACTICE  
 
This section examines the debates of the First Congress 
on the proposed religion amendment to the Constitution with 
specific focus on whether the recorded debates indicate any 
intent to mandate government neutrality towards religion. In 
addition, progressivism and the appropriate degree of judicial 
deference to the intent of the Framers will be considered. 
Finally, eighteenth and nineteenth century United States 
government involvement with religion will be briefly 
surveyed. More specifically, a review will be made of state 
establishment of official religions, state use of religious taxes, 
religion and the Declaration of Independence, religion and 
the proposed government seals, Presidential reliance on 
religion, the use of public prayer, and religion in educational 
institutions. 
 
                                                 
78 Id. at 31-32. 
79 Such opposition is perhaps best exemplified by Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and is most recently exemplified by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) 
(Plurality). 
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A. Debates of the First Congress on the Proposed 
Religion Amendments 
 
In the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789, James 
Madison proposed that the Constitution be amended to 
stipulate that “[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on 
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national 
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of 
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”80 
The amendment was soon referred to a Select Committee that 
included Madison and nine other representatives.81 The Select 
Committee revised Madison’s proposed religion amendment 
to state, no “religion shall be established by law, nor shall the 
equal rights of conscience be infringed.”82 The revised 
amendment was debated in the House on August 15, 1789. 
During the debates Representative Peter Sylvester of New 
York stated that he “feared [the religion amendment] might 
be thought to abolish religion altogether.”83 Representative 
Daniel Carroll of Maryland expressed his support for 
adopting this version of the amendment and articulated, as the 
basis for this support, his belief that “the rights of conscience 
are, in their nature, a peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the 
gentlest touch of governmental hand.”84 Next, Madison tried 
to clarify the scope of the proposed amendment by noting he 
“apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress 
should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal 
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in 
any manner contrary to their conscience.”85 This is a far cry 
from mandating government neutrality towards religion or 
erecting a high and impregnable wall separating church from 
state.  
Directly after Madison’s clarification, Representative 
Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut responded that he 
                                                 
80 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1790).  
81 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
82 Id. 
83 ANNALS OF CONG., supra at note 80, at 729. 
84 Id. at 729. 
85 Id. at 730.   
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feared “that the words might be taken in such latitude as to be 
extremely hurtful to the cause of religion...[and while he] 
understood the amendment to mean what had been expressed 
by [Madison]…others might find it convenient to put another 
construction on it.”86 Huntington stated that he feared this 
language might actually prevent the compelled support of 
religion and he hoped “the amendment would be made in 
such a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and the free 
exercise of religion, but not to [act as a patron towards] those 
who professed no religion at all.”87 Madison responded to the 
concerns of Huntington by moving for the word “national” to 
be inserted before religion, which he believed “would point 
the amendment directly to the object it was intended to 
prevent.”88 Representative Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts 
then opposed Madison’s use of the word “national” because 
the Constitution was ratified with the understanding that it 
created a federal and not a national government, which 
prompted Madison to withdraw his motion.89  
On August 20, 1789, the House adopted a version of the 
religion amendment stating “Congress shall make no law 
establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, 
or to infringe the rights of conscience,” which it sent to the 
Senate for approval.90 The floor debates in the Senate were 
kept secret and only a list of motions and votes is included in 
the Senate Journal. It is clear though that the version 
proposed by the House did generate significant controversy in 
the Senate as the Senate Journal lists that three separate 
motions to change the amendment were made on September 
3, 1789. The controversy was caused by fear in the Senate 
that the religion amendment might be interpreted as 
completely separating church and state, thereby preventing 
                                                 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 730-31.  
88 Id. at 731. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 766 (Unfortunately, the Annals of Congress do not include 
any passages describing what prompted them to adopt this specific 
language).  
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nondiscriminatory aid from being given to religion.91 On 
September 3, 1789, the Senate came to an agreement and sent 
back to the House a version of the religion amendment 
stating, “Congress shall make no law establishing articles of 
faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion.”92 The changes made by the Senate to the 
amendment allow nondiscriminatory aid to religion.  
Ultimately, because the House and Senate could not agree 
on the language of the religion amendment, a joint conference 
committee was created. On September 24, 1789, the House 
considered the report of this committee indicating a 
compromise between the House and Senate had been 
reached.93 Subsequently, both the House and the Senate 
approved a final draft stating, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof” which is the current language of the First 
Amendment.94    
Importantly, the First Congress did directly consider the 
applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states. On August 17, 
1789, South Carolina Representative Thomas Tucker moved 
for the Bill of Rights to be applied to the States (hereinafter 
“Motion”).95 The Motion was strongly supported by Madison 
who opined that the religion amendment was the most 
important of all the proposed amendments and that “[i]f there 
were any reason to restrain the government of the United 
States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was 
equally necessary that they should be secured against the 
state governments.”96 New Hampshire Representative Samuel 
Livermore also supported the motion and proposed that the 
Fourth Amendment state, “The equal rights of conscience, the 
freedom of speech or of the press, and the right of trial by 
                                                 
91 See generally WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Basic Books, Inc. 1976). 
92 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (quoting C. Antieau, et al., Freedom From Federal 
Establishment, at 130 (1964)).  
93 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 80, at 913-14  
94 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
95 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 80, at 755. 
96 Id.  
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jury in criminal cases, shall not be infringed by any state.”97 
Despite Livermore’s support the Motion was nevertheless 
defeated in the House98 indicating that a majority of the First 
Congress wanted to preserve state aid and involvement with 
religion.   
As Justice Rehnquist observed, “[i]t seems indisputable 
from these glimpses of Madison’s thinking…that he saw the 
Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a 
national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination 
among sects…[but] did not see it as requiring neutrality on 
the part of government between religion and irreligion.”99 
Further, the debates of the First Congress strongly indicate 
that the Framers did not intend for government to have no 
involvement with religion. In fact, from the debates on the 
proposed religion amendment, it can be inferred that the 
Framers did not intend the Religion Clauses to create an 
impregnable wall separating church from state or mandating 
government neutrality towards religion. 
Finally, it is necessary to address the requisite deference 
to be accorded to the intentions of the Framers regarding 
government aid and involvement with religion. Some might 
seek to posit progressivism as a means of questioning the 
relevance of the Framers’ intentions. Constitutional 
progressivism, as classically championed by Justice Brennan, 
is rooted in the belief that “the genius of the Constitution 
rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world 
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great 
principles to cope with current problems and needs.”100 Of 
course, to apply the Constitution’s great principles, one must 
                                                 
97 Id.  
98 It is important to note that while the Framers voted against 
applying the Bill of Rights, and therefore the Religion Clauses, to the 
states, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Religion Clauses currently 
apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which was 
adopted in 1868. See, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); 
See also, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
99 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
100 Justice William Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: 
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEXAS L. REV. 433, 438 (1986). 
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first understand them. Inasmuch as the Religion Clauses are 
seen as mandating neutrality towards religion or erecting a 
“high and impregnable wall” separating government and 
religion, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment have 
not been properly understood. In its capacity as a conduit for 
such notions, progressivism has functioned not as a coping 
mechanism but rather as part of the problem.  
In explaining his progressive approach, Brennan 
admonishes “[i]t is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage 
we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on 
application of principle to specific, contemporary 
questions.”101 The proper relationship between government 
and religion, however, is hardly a contemporary question. It 
is not a question spawned by modern technology or one with 
only a contemporary application. Rather, this was a question 
that the Framers considered with great care. Therefore, 
principles of progressivism may have less force here than 
they would in other areas. That is not to say that 
progressivism is without merit or that originalism is always 
the preferable alternative.102  
In the context of the Religion Clauses, however, 
progressivism reveals itself as a red herring. Pragmatically, 
the application of strict neutrality will create more problems 
than it will resolve. In other words, trying to implement strict 
neutrality is not progress. More important, progressivism qua 
progressivism is a moot point as true government neutrality 




                                                 
101 Id. at 435.  
102 Some scholars have raised the question as to whether “original 
intent” actually exists. See, JUDITH BAER, The Fruitless Search for 
Original Intent, in REASON IN LAW. (Leif Carter & Thomas Burke eds., 
Pearson Longman Publishers 2001) (arguing that originalism presupposes 
that a single collective intent exists, is capable of being recorded, and can 
be ascertained in such a manner as to provide a reliable guide for 
Constitutional adjudication).     




B. Early Government Aid and Involvement with 
Religion 
 
Eighteenth and nineteenth century government practices 
also indicate that neutrality and a complete separation of 
church and state were not intended. An historical survey 
reveals that the legacy of government involvement with 
religion spans well into the twentieth century. Indeed, such an 
approach and its ramifications are readily apparent even in 
twenty-first century America.103  
First, in considering neutrality, it is important to 
remember that many states had official religions at the time 
the Constitution was ratified and the Bill of Rights adopted. 
For instance, it is well settled that the Church of England was 
established as the official religion in Georgia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, New York, and Virginia.104 Ultimately, 
“[t]he American Revolution immediately disrupted the 
relationship between religion and government in those 
states…[because the] Church of England was discredited 
during the Revolution by its connection to the Crown and the 
loyalist sympathies of most of its clergy.”105 Proponents of 
religious freedom, such as Thomas Jefferson, capitalized on 
this disruption and sought to utilize such sentiments to 
abolish religious discrimination and official state religions. 
However, the Puritan or Congregational religion remained 
firmly established by law in Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, and Vermont.106 Establishments of religion 
in these states were “more firmly entrenched and emerged 
from the Revolution strengthened by their association with 
the patriot cause.”107 In fact, these states continued to provide 
                                                 
103 This will be discussed in greater detail at section V, subsection C, 
infra. 
104 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 
1436 (1990). 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 1437. 
107 Id.  
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legal and financial support for religion after the ratification of 
both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.108 Clearly, 
neutrality and strict separation were not envisioned or 
implemented in practice.   
The principal vehicle for financial support of religion in 
America was the levying of religious taxes and assessments. 
As the Virginia struggle between Madison and Henry 
illustrates, the issue of religious assessments was a divisive 
and hotly debated topic.  Appeals for such support were made 
in a majority of the states. Aside from the substantial support 
for religious assessments in Virginia, “general assessment 
bills were [also] supported, after 1776, by the legislatures of 
five other states and by a galaxy of revolutionary heroes, 
including John Adams, Samuel Adams, John Hancock, Roger 
Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, and in neighboring Maryland, 
Samuel Chase, William Paca and Charles Carroll.”109 Support 
for religious assessments was also memorialized in the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which “authorized a 
general religious tax to be directed to the church of a 
taxpayers’ choice.”110 Such taxes and state establishments 
serve to illustrate that neutrality towards religion was not 
adopted in practice. 
Governmental reliance on religion was memorialized in 
the celebrated Declaration of Independence [hereinafter 
“Declaration”]. This is of particular relevance given the 
inherent importance of the Declaration and the fact that 
Thomas Jefferson drafted it—after all he was perhaps the 
chief proponent of separating church and state.  The 
Declaration justified dissolution of the “political bonds” that 
connected American colonists to the British by producing a 
detailed list of grievances, which violated the “Laws of 
Nature and Nature’s God.”111 Jefferson ends the Declaration 
                                                 
108 See generally id. at 1436.  
109 James Hutson, James Madison and the Social Utility of Religion: 
Risks vs. Rewards, in Library of Congress Symposium on James Madison, 
http://www.loc.gov/loc/madison/hutson-paper.html (last visited Nov. 15, 
2006). 
110 Library of Congress Exhibition, supra note 41. 
111 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) 
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with an appeal to “the Supreme Judge of the world” in which 
he pledges his support for the Declaration “with a firm 
reliance on the protections of divine Providence.”112 To be 
sure, the Declaration was important for many reasons.113 
Principally, the Declaration and its eloquent reliance on 
religion provided the moral justifications that would turn the 
cause for colonial independence from a mere insurrection into 
a glorious and righteous revolution. 
The religious temperament of the Revolutionary era is 
also reflected in the quest for an official seal of the United 
States. On July 4, 1776, Congress appointed Benjamin 
Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams to create the 
official seal.114 Jefferson suggested adopting a depiction of 
the “Children of Israel in the Wilderness, led by a Cloud by 
Day, and a Pillar of Fire by night.”115 Franklin proposed 
adopting the biblical parting of the Red Sea by Moses.116 
Notably, both men agreed on an official motto to accompany 
the proposed seal: “Rebellion to tyranny; obedience to 
God.”117 The three later agreed on Franklin’s version, which 
was proposed but not adopted by Congress. The use of 
religious imagery for the government seal is particularly 
poignant as it was advocated by Jefferson—the man who is 
now seen by many as having advocated the high and 
impregnable wall of separation.  
                                                 
112 Id. 
113 Having provided the impetus for the revolution it could arguably 
be described as providing the impetus for the Civil War. During his 
debates on slavery with Senator Douglas, Abraham Lincoln relied heavily 
on the Declaration’s assertion that all men had certain unalienable rights 
and were created equal. See, Lincoln’s Speech at Springfield, Illinois, 
June 26, 1857.  
114 Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel04.html (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2006). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/f0402bs.jpg, 
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/f0402as.jpg 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2006). 
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Governmental reliance on religion is also reflected in the 
speeches, proclamations, and correspondence of nearly all 
Unites States Presidents. Indeed, “[e]ach of our Presidents, 
from George Washington to John F. Kennedy, has upon 
assuming his Office asked the protection and help of God.”118 
As discussed in greater detail below, George Washington 
made frequent appeals to religion for both guidance and 
political stability. Washington’s predecessors continued his 
legacy of advocating formal government reliance on religion. 
On March 23, 1798, President John Adams continued the 
tradition begun in 1775 and issued a Fast and Thanksgiving 
Day Proclamation.119 In his Proclamation, Adams described 
prayer as a duty and sought the favorable judgment of God by 
directing citizens to “acknowledge before God the manifold 
sins and transgressions with which we are justly chargeable 
as individuals and as a nation…and to incline us, by His Holy 
Spirit, to that sincere repentance and reformation which may 
afford us reason to hope for his inestimable favor and 
heavenly benediction.”120 Such sentiments continued well 
into the twentieth century. As observed by Justice Stewart, in 
1961, President John F. Kennedy urged “[w]ith a good 
conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge 
of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking 
His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth 
God’s work must truly be our own.”121 
Such statements represent only the tip of the iceberg in 
terms of officially sanctioned public prayer. On June 28, 
1787, Franklin successfully called for such prayer to open 
each day of the Constitutional Convention.122 In its initial 
meeting in September of 1774, Congress invited Reverend 
                                                 
118 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
119 Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel06.html (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2006). 
120 Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/vc006493.jpg 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2006). 
121 Engel, 370 U.S. at 449 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
122 MADISON, supra note 50, at 209-11. 
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Jacob Duché to open its session with prayer.123 When Duché 
defected to the British, on October 1, 1777, Congress 
appointed William White and George Duffield, each 
representing a different religious denomination, as his 
successors.124 Church services were held in the House of 
Representatives until after the Civil War and literally used the 
podium of the Speaker as a preacher’s pulpit.125 Chaplains 
were used not only by Congress but also by the military and 
in state and federal prisons.126  
To this day every session of Congress is opened with a 
publicly financed prayer.127 Since 1777, the salary of all such 
chaplains has been paid for with public funds.128 Also, at the 
beginning of each United States Supreme Court Session, “one 
of our officials invokes the protection of God…[because 
since] the days of John Marshall our Crier has said, ‘God 
save the United States and this Honorable Court.’”129 Such 
practices surely reflect the notion that government may rely 
on religion but that it should strive to do so in a 
nondiscriminatory manner. Such an interpretation is 
consistent with the fact that in 1952 Congress enacted 36 
U.S.C. §185, which calls upon the President to proclaim a 
National Day of Prayer each year.130 
It is also important to briefly survey early government aid 
and involvement with religion in the context of education. 
The United States is heavily reliant on educational 
institutions to produce moral and intellectual sustenance for 
the government. Such reliance was explicitly referenced in 
the Northwest Ordinance, which was adopted by Congress in 
1787 to regulate territories northwest of the Ohio River. 
Specifically, Article three of the Northwest Ordinance 
                                                 
123 Library of Congress Exhibition, supra note 114. 
124 Id. 
125 Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel06-2.html 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2006). 
126 Engel, 370 U.S. at 449 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. at 446. 
128 Id. at 449. 
129 Id. at 446. 
130 Id. at 449.  
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pronounces that “Religion, Morality and knowledge being 
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
Schools and the means of education shall be forever 
encouraged.”131 As Justice Rehnquist observed, in 1789 the 
First Congress reenacted this ordinance on the same day that 
Madison proposed his religion amendment, which appears to 
“confirm the view that Congress did not mean that the 
Government should be neutral between religion and 
irreligion.”132    
Kent Greenawalt, Professor of Law at Columbia 
University, remarks that from the outset “education in the 
early American colonies was almost entirely private and 
substantially religious.”133 This is relevant because up to and 
throughout the nineteenth century, both state and municipal 
governments subsidized religious schools on a per pupil 
basis.134 Religion also played a significant role in public 
schools. Professor Greenawalt found that “the character of 
the original public schools was indisputably a broad 
nondenominational Protestantism…[and although] schools 
were ‘non-sectarian’ their teaching and practice were 
significantly religious.”135  
This review is not intended to serve as a recommendation 
to reinstate all the religious practices of the forefathers of the 
United States. Rather, it is intended to survey the religious 
heritage of the United States and to indicate that the First 
Amendment was not understood to mandate impartiality 
towards religion and irreligion. Simply put, the history of 
early government aid and involvement with religion is 
inconsistent with Jefferson’s wall metaphor and can hardly be 
said to represent government neutrality towards religion. 
 
                                                 
131 The Avalon Project, Northwest Ordinance, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nworder.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 
2007). 
132 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
133 KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 13 
(Princeton University Press 1995). 
134 Id. at 14. 
135 Id. at 14. 
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IV.        GOVERNMENT MUST INTERACT WITH RELIGION 
AND SUCH INTERACTION IS GENERALLY 
FRIENDLY OR HOSTILE TOWARDS RELIGION 
 
This section will review the natural connection between 
government and religion and the notion that this connection 
ensures that government must have some relationship with 
religion. In maintaining such a relationship, generally 
speaking, the government is either friendly or hostile towards 
particular religions. This phenomenon will be discussed in 
relation to the modern neutrality ideal. Further, a survey of 
modern case law and government practices will illustrate that 
government action has been friendly or hostile towards 
particular religions.  
 
A. The Natural Connection between Government 
and Religion and its Implications 
 
Government and religion share a natural connection as 
human institutions. More specifically, both government and 
religion are collective institutions as they coordinate the 
cooperative efforts of individuals and function as 
mechanisms of social order, progress, and advantage. By 
virtue of their status as collective institutions an inherent 
connection exists between the two entities. Inasmuch as 
humans are natural beings, both institutions are products of 
nature. For this reason, the connection existing between the 
two can be described as natural—in a literal sense.  
Despite their natural connection, many insist that 
government and religion must occupy separate and distinct 
spheres in the realm of human existence. This presupposes 
that government and religion are capable of being relegated 
to separate and distinct spheres. Notably, such a separation 
would require relegation because the two are naturally 
intertwined by their status as human institutions. With regard 
to this it is important to briefly review the “state-society” 
distinction discussed by Harvard Professor Harvey 
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Mansfield, in his treatise, America’s Constitutional Soul.136 
This distinction generally involves the notion that the “state, 
which is public, is in the service of society, which is private; 
and the state is limited to this service as a means is limited by 
its end.”137 Professor Mansfield recognized that, “[m]odern 
constitutional government is limited government in which the 
limitation on government is expressed in the distinction 
between state and society.”138 In order to consider the natural 
connection between government and religion, it is first 
necessary to define and develop an understanding of “state” 
and “society” as independent concepts. This is necessary, 
although perhaps counterintuitive, as human civilization 
naturally intertwines the two.   
On one hand, the state encompasses the realm of 
constitutional government and is a product of human 
nature.139 The state has power over the physical realm and in 
keeping with “the premise of modern constitutionalism … 
government is constituted by humans to answer human 
needs.”140 On the other hand, while it is also a product of 
human nature, society encompasses the realm of the 
conscience or soul.141 Society has power over the spiritual 
realm and as it encompasses religion “is primarily concerned 
with saving souls, not with constitutional freedom.”142 Both 
government and religion provide protection and sustenance—
government protects and sustains the body and religion 
protects and sustains the soul. Overall, the glue that holds this 
system together is the byproduct of protection in both 
instances—stability. Because government and religion each 
require stability and when properly instituted government and 
religion each produce stability, the two crave, if not depend, 
on each other for survival. 
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Given interdependence of government and religion and 
the importance of protecting both the body and soul, it is 
prudent to institute an arrangement that does not secure one at 
the expense of the other. Yet, Mansfield implies that today 
the “self” passes for the soul and has replaced the soul’s 
search for spiritual perfection with the quest for material 
well-being.143 Mansfield attributes this to an imbalance in the 
state society continuum whereby “the soul gradually 
abdicates its ruling function” and results in the “apathetic 
individualism Tocqueville feared, which we see in the wishy-
washy liberal and the uncaring conservative.”144 
Ultimately, government and religion can be understood as 
representing two sides of the same coin. On one side of the 
coin is religion and on the other side of the coin is 
government. The coin itself is modern civilization. This is an 
apt metaphor for three reasons. First, state and society are the 
respective homes for government and religion. Government 
and religion protect and sustain the body and the soul 
respectively. Each of the preceding distinctions can be seen 
as representing two sides that combine to form one whole—
as is true with a coin. Second, government and religion enjoy 
a symbiotic relationship in which they are dependent to a 
large degree on each other. In other words, if we try to 
separate the two sides of the coin, the coin itself will be 
destroyed.  
Third, government and religion must be separated to 
some degree because “the soul, in its unruly desire to rule 
itself, [may try] to rule other souls.”145 In other words, a 
religious faction existing in society may seek to use the 
power of the government to rule the whole of society. 
Government and religion, therefore, should not morph 
together to form a single institution just as the images on a 
double-sided coin cannot leave their respective locations to 
form a single sided coin. If we try to literally combine the 
two sides of the coin, the coin will again be destroyed. For 
this reason it is important that we try to find a state of 
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equilibrium where religion and government are neither 
separated as two unrelated institutions nor are merged 
together as one single institution.     
From this understanding it is clear that government must 
have some relationship with religion. Finding the state of 
equilibrium is of course no easy task. The Religion Clauses 
do not provide a simple recipe with which to achieve this. 
Such a recipe, if it is to exist at all, must be discerned from 
practice—from a process of trial and error. Striving to reach 
that state of equilibrium is a difficult task indeed. The task, 
however, is made more difficult when government neutrality 
towards religion is established as the primary objective. This 
is true for three reasons. First, neutrality has been interpreted 
to mean that we must erect a high and impregnable wall 
separating government and religion. Such an approach favors 
irreligion by precluding the government from providing 
religion with nonpreferential support. Favoring irreligion as 
such is clearly hostile to religion and cannot accurately be 
characterized as fostering impartiality, which is the apparent 
objective of neutrality. Second, because it has produced 
hostility towards religion, neutrality does not treat religion 
and government as two sides of the same coin. This has the 
practical effect of reducing stability and producing a less 
stable government. Finally, pragmatically speaking, neutrality 
is impossible to achieve. True neutrality requires actual 
impartiality. Actual impartiality is seemingly unattainable, as 
it would require not only divorcing oneself from personal 
preferences and predilections, but also a consideration of all 
possible factors and contingencies.  
In considering neutrality it is important to keep in mind 
the dualism, which is contained in the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment. A close examination of the Religion 
Clauses reveals an inescapable tension between the two. On 
the one hand, the First Amendment is inherently friendly to 
religion by virtue of its stipulation that Congress shall make 
no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. On the other 
hand, the First Amendment is inherently hostile to religion in 
that it also prescribes that Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion. Given this 
146          Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law        Vol. 2 
 
  
dichotomy, it is not surprising that nearly all attempts at 
neutrality have produced an action or decision that is 
inherently friendly or hostile towards religion. That is, most 
governmental attempts at neutrality can be characterized as 
producing a result that is either favorable or unfavorable 
towards religion. 
 
B.  Case Law Illustrates that Government   
Interaction with Religion is Inherently Hostile 
or Friendly 
 
In considering government interaction with religion it is 
helpful to review the jurisprudence surrounding the Religion 
Clauses. For this reason a summary will be made of the 
Supreme Court’s modern Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.  Specific attention will be given to the 
various tests formulated by the Supreme Court to identify 
violations of the clauses. The summary will also highlight the 
government and religion interaction and show that such 
interaction is generally hostile or friendly in nature.  
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
prescribes that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion. While this language may seem 
straightforward to a casual observer, it must be considered 
relative to the First Amendment’s mandate that Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. 
Applying these principles to cases or controversies has 
proven to be an arduous task due in large part to the 
ambiguity of the Religion Clauses. While the language 
contained in the clauses gives some guidance as to the proper 
relationship between government and religion, it does not 
provide a clear map with which to navigate the waters of 
every such interaction. This ambiguity in turn has resulted in 
a tumultuous body of jurisprudence, which can best be 
described as a swinging pendulum. At one end of the 
pendulum’s arc, the Supreme Court has given great strength 
to the Establishment Clause at the expense of the Free 
Exercise Clause. This is the hostile arc of the pendulum. The 
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Pendulum, however, began to swing in the opposite direction 
with Sherbert v. Verner.146    
Sherbert involved a situation where a Seventh-Day 
Adventist was terminated by her employer for refusing to 
work on Saturday, which is considered to be the Sabbath Day 
for all Seventh-Day Adventists. Unable to find other work, 
Ms. Sherbert filed a claim for unemployment compensation 
benefits pursuant to the South Carolina Unemployment 
Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as “Act”). The Act 
stipulated that an applicant is not eligible for benefits if they 
have failed to accept suitable work when offered without 
good cause. Consequently, the South Carolina Employment 
Security Commission denied her unemployment 
compensation on the ground that her refusal to work 
Saturdays prevented her from accepting suitable work. The 
decision of the commission was upheld by both the Court of 
Common Pleas for Spartanburg County and the South 
Carolina Supreme Court.147  
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the South 
Carolina Supreme Court. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Brennan held the denial of unemployment benefits to Ms. 
Sherbert restricted the free exercise of her religion. Following 
this determination Brennan stated “[w]e must next consider 
whether some compelling state interest enforced in the 
eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies 
the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment 
right.”148 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the rational 
basis approach by stating, “no showing merely of a rational 
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in 
this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘only the gravest 
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for 
permissible limitation.’”149 Ultimately, the Supreme Court 
found that South Carolina’s interest in denying 
unemployment benefits to Ms. Sherbert did not justify the 
restriction of her right to freely exercise her religion.  
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The Supreme Court also found that compelling South 
Carolina to extend unemployment benefits did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. Brennan stated that in rendering such a 
holding the Supreme Court is not fostering the establishment 
of the Seventh-Day Adventist religion as “the extension of 
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with 
Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the 
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious 
differences, and does not represent that involvement of 
religion with secular institutions which it is the object of the 
Establishment Clause to forestall.”150 But was the Supreme 
Court’s decision truly neutral? Would this decision and the 
adoption of the strict scrutiny standard be more accurately 
characterized as friendly towards religion? This conclusion 
was alluded to by Justice Stewart, who observed that the 
Supreme Court’s holding requires North Carolina to “prefer a 
religious over a secular ground for being unavailable for 
work.”151 Requiring such a preference, despite its benign 
motive, is friendly towards religion. Implementing strict 
scrutiny in place of the rational basis test is also friendly 
towards religion. 
The same would not be true if the Supreme Court upheld 
the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court. To deny 
unemployment compensation to an individual whose 
religious beliefs preclude her from working on Saturdays 
cannot be described as friendly toward religion. To the 
contrary, such a decision is more accurately characterized as 
hostile to religion. Therefore, neutrality was a red herring in 
the Supreme Court’s analysis as the Justices were forced to 
choose between two alternatives—one that is friendly 
towards religion and the other that is hostile towards religion. 
In an effort to clarify the bounds of the Establishment 
Clause, in 1971 the Supreme Court created a three-prong test 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.152 The Lemon test provides that to be 
consistent with the Establishment Clause, government action 
must have 1) a secular purpose, 2) a primary effect that 
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neither advances nor inhibits religion, and 3) must not foster 
an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.153 In 
Lemon, the Supreme Court relied on this test in striking down 
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes that provided state 
aid to religious schools regarding instruction in secular 
matters. To deny such aid only to religious schools is hostile 
towards religion. Again, the alternative, upholding the Rhode 
Island and Pennsylvania statutes, would be favorable or 
friendly towards religion.  
Ultimately, the Lemon test reflects an attempt “to add 
some mortar to Everson's wall.”154 At best the Lemon test 
provides little guidance to the Supreme Court and at worst it 
solidifies a misunderstanding of the Establishment Clause as 
it perpetuates the neutrality ideal. Further, the test functions 
primarily as a conduit for religious hostility. Justice 
Rehnquist observed that reliance on the Lemon test distorts 
the Establishment Clause as it “bristles with hostility to all 
things religious in public life.”155 Rehnquist states that the 
Lemon test “has simply not provided adequate standards for 
deciding Establishment Clause cases…[because the test] 
represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a 
historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be as sound 
as the doctrine it attempts to service.”156  
In the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,157 the Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to review its Free Exercise 
jurisprudence. In Yoder, the Supreme Court considered 
whether the conviction of an Amish man, for violating 
Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law based on the 
tenants of his faith, could be upheld without violating the 
Free Exercise Clause.158 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a 
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156 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
157 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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six-justice majority, applied strict scrutiny and, although the 
law was neutral on its face, held that the Wisconsin law “in 
its application, nonetheless offend[s] the constitutional 
requirement for governmental neutrality [because] it unduly 
burden[ed] the free exercise of religion.”159 Carving out a 
religious exception to a generally applicable law is more 
accurately characterized as friendly rather than neutral 
towards religion. In short, Yoder is another illustration that 
applying strict scrutiny in free exercise cases will produce a 
result inherently friendly towards religion. On the other hand, 
not carving out an exception—forcing Yoder to violate the 
tenants of his faith—would be hostile towards religion.    
In 1983, the Supreme Court’s struggle to interpret the 
Establishment Clause turned a new page with Marsh v. 
Chambers. 160 In Marsh, the Supreme Court did not apply the 
Lemon test and extended a friendly hand towards religion in 
holding that Nebraska did not violate the Establishment 
Clause by using state funds to pay a chaplain to open its 
legislative sessions with prayer.161 In justifying its decision 
the Supreme Court relied heavily on the use of chaplains for 
public prayer by the First Congress.162 Unfortunately, instead 
of relying on the historical understanding of the 
Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court carved out an 
exception for this practice and did so despite the fact that it is 
entirely inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the Lemon 
test. Next, in the 1983 case of Mueller v. Allen,163 the 
Supreme Court further undermined the Lemon test by 
upholding a Minnesota law, which provided a tax deduction 
to parents sending their children to religious schools. In 
                                                                                                     
the law by refusing to send his two children, aged 14 and 15, to public 
school after they completed the eighth grade. The conviction was affirmed 
by the Wisconsin Circuit Court but was reversed by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, which found that the conviction violated the defendant’s 
Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment.  Id.). 
159 Id. at 220 (emphasis added) (As support for this proposition Chief 
Justice Burger cited Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).  
160 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
161 Id. at 791-95. 
162 Id. at 790. 
163 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
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writing for the majority in this case, Justice Rehnquist started 
the trend away from Eversonian jurisprudence, as the 
Supreme Court’s decision was “flatly at odds with the 
fundamental principle that a State may provide no financial 
support whatsoever to promote religion.”164   
In 1984, the Supreme Court applied the Lemon test in 
Lynch v. Donnelly
165 and upheld the constitutionality of an 
annual Christmas display.166 This decision was friendly 
towards religion. In writing for the majority Chief Justice 
Burger confirmed that total separation between government 
and religion is not possible and that the Constitution 
“affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely 
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility towards 
any.”167 In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor formulated the 
basis for an endorsement test, which states that one runs afoul 
of the Establishment Clause if government action amounts to 
an endorsement or disapproval of a particular religion.168 This 
test is less hostile to religion as it does not appear to mandate 
governmental neutrality between religion and irreligion and 
therefore is more aligned with the historical understanding of 
the clause. 
In 1985 the pendulum swung back towards hostility when 
the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama law authorizing 
schools to set aside one minute each day for voluntary prayer 
or meditation in Wallace v. Jaffree.169 Justice Stevens, in 
striking down the law, relied heavily on the Lemon test and 
“the established principle that the government must pursue a 
course of complete neutrality toward religion.”170 This 
decision resulted in a strong dissent from Justice Rehnquist 
who remained convinced that the “Establishment Clause did 
not require government neutrality between religion and 
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irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from 
providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion.”171 Despite the 
force of his analysis, the Supreme Court later struck down 
programs in which publicly funded teachers offered 
supplementary classes in remedial math and reading in 
parochial schools.172 In the 1986 case of Goldman v. 
Weinberger,173 the Supreme Court continued its trend of 
hostility towards religion and signaled a turning of the tide 
against the vigorous reading of the Free Exercise Clause 
established in Sherbert and Yoder, when it upheld an air force 
regulation prohibiting an Orthodox Jewish psychiatrist from 
wearing his yarmulke while on duty. In 1988 the Supreme 
Court seemingly adopted a per se rule that government land 
use decisions need not be curtailed by the impact that they 
may have on religious practices.174 These decisions were the 
precursors for the hostile revolution, which was soon to 
dominate the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence.  
This revolution was cemented in the 1990 case of 
Employment Division v. Smith.
175 In Smith, the Supreme 
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not require 
Oregon to demonstrate a compelling state interest to prohibit 
Native American religious use of Peyote through generally 
applicable state drug laws.176 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia distinguishes Sherbert and limits the application of 
strict scrutiny to unemployment cases and hybrid cases.177 
The Supreme Court’s decision is clearly hostile to the 
religious beliefs of the Native Americans. In dissent, Justice 
Blackmun describes such hostility as undermining religious 
                                                 
171 Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
172 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 
U.S. 203 (1997) (the Court overruled Aguilar and held that such aid is 
permissible if it is made available to secular and sectarian beneficiaries on 
a nondiscriminatory basis).   
173 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
174 Lyng v. Northwest Protective Cemetery Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988). 
175 Employ. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990). 
176 Id. at 872. 
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liberty and as inconsistent with the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act.178 
While the pendulum of religious liberty was swinging 
towards hostility in the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise 
jurisprudence, the pendulum was swinging away from 
hostility in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
In 1992, the Supreme Court held in Lee v. Weisman,179 that 
inviting a Rabbi to say prayers at a public middle school 
graduation violates the Establishment Clause because it 
subtly coerces support or participation in a religious exercise. 
For the majority Justice Kennedy stipulated that the 
Constitution guarantees a state religion will not be established 
and “that government may not coerce anyone to support or 
participate in religion or its exercise”180 In advancing this 
standard, Kennedy put particular emphasis on the need to 
“distinguish between real threat and mere shadow.”181 While 
this may not immediately appear friendly towards religion, 
Justice Kennedy’s coercion test was actually a step in that 
direction Like Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, the 
coercion test is friendly towards religion because it does not 
mandate government neutrality towards religion and 
irreligion.   
In 1993, Congress appeared to express its discontent with 
the religious hostility of the Smith decision by voting to pass 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act [hereinafter 
“RFRA”]. Through RFRA Congress extended its imprimatur 
to the Sherbert decision and sought to mandate the 
application of strict scrutiny for all Free Exercise claims. 
Notwithstanding this enactment, the pendulum of religious 
liberty reached a hostile apex in its arc in 1997 with the 
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American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 92 Stat. 469, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 
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protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom 
to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions…, including but 
not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the 
freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rights.” Id.).    
179 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
180 Id. at 587. 
181 Id. at 598.  
154          Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law        Vol. 2 
 
  
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.182 In 
Boerne, the Supreme Court held that Congress had exceeded 
its power with RFRA and found RFRA unconstitutional as it 
was applied to the states.183 The decision can be seen as 
reaching an apex in religious hostility because it firmly 
establishes the Smith standard of review as the proper 
standard for considering free exercise claims. The Supreme 
Court affirmed Smith despite the fact that in doing so it was 
directly contradicting the expressed intent of Congress, over 
thirty years of free exercise jurisprudence, and the vast array 
of historical evidence in support of adopting strict scrutiny.184  
Characteristically, the pendulum swung back towards 
hostility in 2000 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa 
Fe Independent School District v. Doe.185 In Santa Fe, the 
Supreme Court held that merely giving students the 
opportunity to vote on whether to have prayer at public 
school football games facially violates the Lemon test.186 In 
dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist found this decision “bristled 
with hostility” towards religion and “[n]either the holding nor 
the tone of the opinion is faithful to the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause.”187 Fortunately, the pendulum was not 
                                                 
182 Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
183 Id. at 519 (Justice Kennedy noted that RFRA was an apparent 
attempt to alter constitutional protections (essentially the Court’s decision 
in Smith) through a mere legislative act. He found this to pose problems 
in terms of both federalism and the separation of powers). Cf., Gonzales 
v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 
(2006) (unanimously deciding that the federal government may not 
burden the free exercise of religion unless they can demonstrate a 
compelling interest for doing so because RFRA is still binding on the 
Federal Government).     
184 This is true by virtue of 1) the 1963 Sherbert decision (see 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)), 2) the substantive intent of 
RFRA (see Religious Freedom of Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb 
(1993)), and 3) the paramount importance that was given to religious 
liberty by our founding fathers.   
185 Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
186 Id. at 315. 
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rooted as firmly in the arc of hostility for the Establishment 
Clause as it is for the Free Exercise Clause.188  
This point is further illustrated by the Supreme Court’s 
2002 decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,189 which upheld 
the Cleveland school voucher program. Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that providing school 
vouchers, used primarily to attend sectarian schools at public 
expense, does not constitute a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.190 This decision is friendly in nature and rests on the 
notion that government aid programs may benefit sectarian 
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.191 Rehnquist went 
further by stating that the Constitution does not mandate 
governmental neutrality towards religion and irreligion.192 
The Supreme Court was given an opportunity to address such 
notions in 2004 but did not elect to do so.193 
The current location of the pendulum’s arc with regard to 
the Establishment Clause is difficult to pinpoint. This is true 
by virtue of the inconsistency between the Supreme Court’s 
2005 decisions in Van Orden v. Perry194 and McCreary 
County v. ACLU.195 In McCreary, the Supreme Court applied 
the Lemon test and held by a 5-4 majority that the display of 
the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky courthouses 
violated the Establishment Clause.196 Justice Stevens, for the 
majority, cited Epperson and noted that the “touchstone for 
[his] analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment 
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and 
                                                 
188 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (hostilely holding for a 
7-2 majority that Washington State does not offend the Free Exercise 
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religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’”197 Stevens 
goes further and proclaims, “[w]hen the government acts with 
the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing 
religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of 
official religious neutrality.”198 Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, 
Thomas, and Kennedy were not convinced by this argument. 
Historical and philosophical considerations aside, one is hard 
pressed to find real guidance from this case in light of the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Van Orden.  
In Van Orden, the Supreme Court affirmed a U.S. District 
Court decision that the location of a Texas Ten 
Commandments monument on the Texas state capital 
grounds does not violate the Establishment Clause.199 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, in announcing the decision of the Supreme 
Court, indicates that the Lemon test is not a controlling test as 
“we have not, and do not, adhere to the principle that the 
Establishment Clause bars any and all governmental 
preference for religion over irreligion.”200 This is clearly 
incompatible with the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in 
McCreary. Noting as much, Justice Stevens dissents, 
remarking again that the “principle that guides my analysis is 
neutrality…[because neutrality is] firmly rooted in our 
Nation's history and our Constitution's text.”201 Neutrality has 
roots in the nation’s history only in the dictum of the Court 
and even there it is a weed in the garden of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Neutrality is not expressly mandated by the 
Constitution and history indicates that the Framers did not 
view the Religion Clauses as mandating neutrality. Stevens 
himself concedes “the requirement that government must 
remain neutral between religion and irreligion would have 
seemed foreign to some of the Framers.”202 Based on the 
religious history of the United States, it would be more 
                                                 
197 Id. at 860 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 
(1968)).   
198 Id. at 860. 
199 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677-81. 
200 Id. at 684. 
201 Id. at 733 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
202 Id. at 734 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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accurate to state that a neutrality ideal would have seemed 
foreign to the vast majority of our founding fathers. 
From this summary of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, it appears that judicial interaction with religion 
is inherently friendly or hostile towards religion. Insofar as 
this is true, neutrality is a red herring in the Supreme Court’s 
analysis. In most instances, therefore, establishing neutrality 
as the ideal functions only to distort the Supreme Court’s 
analysis. This distortion has greatly magnified the tension 
between the Religion Clauses and has been a major 
contributing factor in creating instability and incongruence in 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.     
 
C. Modern Government Practices Illustrate that 
Government Interaction with Religion is 
Inherently Hostile or Friendly 
 
In view of the swinging pendulum that is the Supreme 
Court’s Religion Clauses jurisprudence, it is likely that other 
forms of government interaction with religion will also 
illustrate inherent hostility or friendliness. A review of 
modern government practices supports this conclusion. From 
the above review of early aid and involvement with religion, 
it is clear that most early government practices were friendly 
in nature towards religion.203 Similarly, there are many 
modern government practices, such as providing religious 
entities with property tax exemptions, which appear to be 
friendly towards religion.204  
                                                 
203 See infra section III, subsection B. Surely state establishments of 
religion and use of religious taxes, reliance on religion in the Declaration 
of Independence, the reliance on religious imagery in the quest for an 
official government seal, religious proclamations and presidential 
speeches, the prevalence of public prayer, and the presence of religion in 
virtually all educational institutions each support the notion that early 
government involvement with religion was primarily friendly in nature.   
204 Justice Thomas observed “[t]he historical evidence of government 
support for religious entities through property tax exemptions is… 
overwhelming.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 859 (1995). 
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For instance, the motto “IN GOD WE TRUST” appears 
on United States currency and coins. The United States 
Department of the Treasury states that during the Civil War it 
began to receive many appeals to recognize God on coins.205 
The first such recorded appeal came in a November 13, 1861 
letter to Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase, which was 
written by Rev. M.R. Watkinson of Ridleyville, 
Pennsylvania.206 Watkinson wrote that recognizing God on 
the coins “would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible 
citizen could object…[and] would place us openly under the 
Divine protection we have personally claimed.”207 Secretary 
Chase then wrote a letter to James Pollack, Director of the 
mint at Philadelphia informing him that the “trust of our 
people in God should be declared on our national coins” and 
thereafter instructing him to create “a motto expressing in the 
fewest and tersest words possible this national 
recognition.”208 Pollack subsequently suggested “OUR 
COUNTRY; OUR GOD” or “GOD, OUR TRUST”, which 
was later modified by Secretary Chase to read “IN GOD WE 
TRUST.”209  
This motto first appeared on the 1864 two-cent coin and 
later was approved by Congress to appear on all coins.210 The 
motto was approved to appear on paper currency beginning in 
1957 and eventually was included on the back of all currency 
by 1966.211 This formal reliance on divine protection was 
cemented in 1956 when the 84th Congress passed a joint 
resolution, approved by the President, which established IN 
GOD WE TRUST as the official motto of the United 
                                                 
205 United States Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheets: Currency 
& Coins- History of 'In God We Trust', http://www.ustreas.gov/education/ 





210 Id. On February 12, 1873 Congress passed the Coinage Act, which 
authorized “the motto IN GOD WE TRUST to be inscribed on such coins 
as shall admit of such motto.” Id. 
211 Id. 
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States.212 The use and adoption of this motto is seemingly 
friendly towards religion in that it memorializes, on all forms 
of currency, a national reliance on divine protection. This is 
particularly friendly to some religions in that currency qua 
currency allows this message to be transmitted and perhaps 
internalized by a large number of people. On the other hand, 
this message can be viewed as biased or hostile towards 
religion in that not all religions believe in God. Notably, in its 
redeeming capacity, ceremonial deism perpetuates religious 
hostility.213 Ceremonial deism prevents the Supreme Court 
from subjecting longstanding government practices to fair 
scrutiny under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 
Because such practices favor particular religions, ceremonial 
deism aids certain religions at the expense of others. Still, in 
its reliance on tradition, ceremonial deism does serve to 
reinforce the notion that the United States was friendly 
towards religion by virtue of its religious heritage.    
The Pledge of Allegiance [hereinafter “Pledge”] is 
another important example of officially sanctioned 
government involvement with religion. The Pledge was 
initially proposed in 1892 and stated, “I pledge allegiance to 
my Flag and the Republic for which it stands: one Nation 
indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.”214 In 1942 the 
President approved a joint resolution of Congress codifying 
as the official Pledge, “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the 
United States of America and to the Republic for which it 
stands, one Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for 
all.”215 In 1956, Congress amended the Pledge to include the 
words “under God” resulting in its current form which states 
“I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of 
                                                 
212  Id. 
213 Ceremonial deism carves out a special exception under the 
Religion Clauses for certain longstanding government practices involving 
religion on the basis that such practices currently represent ceremonial 
traditions and not simply religious exercises. See, Elk Grove Unified Sch. 
Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,36-39 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
214 Id. at 6. Justice Stevens explained that approximately thirty years 
later the phrase “my Flag” was replaced with “the flag of the United 
States of America” pursuant to the National Flag Conferences. Id.  
215 Id.  
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America and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation 
under God indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”216 
Further, Justice Stevens points out that the “House Report 
that accompanied the legislation observed that, ‘[f]rom the 
time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions 
have reflected the traditional concept that our Nation was 
founded on a fundamental belief in God.’”217  
In keeping with the religion infused national motto, the 
Pledge’s religious reference is inherently friendly towards 
religions believing in God and hostile towards religions not 
believing in God.218 The Pledge is perhaps inherently friendly 
to monotheistic religions because it describes our nation as 
existing under a God. Inasmuch as God is not a central 
component of all religions the phrase “under God” seems to 
undermine the tenants of other religions, which can be seen 
as hostile towards them.  
A brief survey of educational practices and institutions 
also reflects that government interaction with religion is 
friendly or hostile in nature. This is exemplified by 
government financial assistance to religious schools, school 
prayer, and the debate surrounding evolution, creationism, 
and intelligent design. In terms of financial assistance it is 
helpful to consider the decisions produced in Everson, 
Lemon, and Agostini v. Felton.219 In Everson, the Supreme 
Court issued a decision upholding the constitutionality of 
using public funds to provide busing for children to private 
religious schools.220 This decision is friendly to religion in 
that it provides transportation to religious schools, which is 
helpful to students wishing to attend such schools. If the 
Supreme Court had struck down this program, however, it 
would have had the effect of denying such aid only to 
religious schools. Such a denial, rooted exclusively in the fact 
                                                 
216 Id. at 7. 
217 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p 2 (1954)).   
218 See section V, subsection C, infra, for a discussion of the apparent 
Constitutional implications of overt government references to God.    
219 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).  
220 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
2007 In Impartiality We Trust  161 
 
  
that such schools are religious in nature, would be hostile 
towards religion.  
Next, in Lemon, the Supreme Court held that public funds 
could not be used to subsidize the salaries of teachers in 
religious schools. Striking down such programs is hostile to 
religion inasmuch as such subsidization is otherwise allowed 
for nonreligious private schools.221 Therefore, this decision 
has the effect of denying a government benefit to select 
schools on the basis of religion only. However, if the 
Supreme Court upheld the subsidization scheme it would 
have provided significant financial assistance to religious 
schools, which is friendly towards religion. Similarly, in 
Agostini, the Supreme Court held that public funds might aid 
religious institutions provided that such aid is available to 
both religious and nonreligious beneficiaries on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.222 The Agostini decision has the 
effect of allowing religious schools to receive the same aid 
that nonreligious schools receive, which is favorable—and 
therefore friendly to religion. Denying financial assistance to 
religious schools in this context, however, is hostile to 
religion.  
The debate over school prayer provides another example 
that government interaction with religion is either friendly or 
hostile in nature. In surveying this debate, it is helpful to 
consider the decisions produced in Abington School District 
v. Schempp,223 Wallace, and Santa Fe Independent School 
District. In Abington, the Supreme Court held that a state law 
allowing teachers to read passages from the bible or lead 
prayers on a voluntary basis violated the Establishment 
Clause.224 This decision is hostile to religion insofar as it 
precludes students from learning about religion and 
practicing their beliefs in public schools—even on a 
voluntary basis. On the other hand, allowing such practices 
would be friendly to religion, as it would allow students to 
                                                 
221 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971). 
222 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203-04. 
223 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
224 Id. at 203-05. (The state law allowed students who did not wish to 
participate to be excused from such exercises. Id. at 205.) 
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learn about religion and would increase their ability to 
practice their religious beliefs. The Supreme Court extended 
the hostility encapsulated in Abington, one step further in its 
Wallace decision. The Supreme Court held in Wallace that 
the Constitution prevents a state from authorizing its schools 
to set aside one minute of silence each day for voluntary 
prayer or mediation.225 This is hostile in that it prevents 
students from having the opportunity for one minute of silent, 
self-initiated religious reflection. The Supreme Court 
solidified this hostility in the Santa Fe case when it held that 
students could not vote on whether to have a prayer at a 
school football game.226 If the Supreme Court allowed the 
voluntary prayers in Wallace and Santa Fe they would have 
provided students with an outlet for religious expression, 
which is favorable towards religion.  
In addition, the debate surrounding evolution, 
creationism, and intelligent design in public school 
curriculums has produced similar results. In Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 227 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an 
Arkansas law, which sought to prevent evolution from being 
taught in public schools. This result is hostile to many 
religions as the theory of evolution instructs that all creatures 
have evolved, which undermines and contradicts important 
tenants of their religious faith. This in turn prompted religious 
adherents to push for creationism and intelligent design to be 
taught alongside evolution.228 In an effort to secure this result 
the Louisiana legislature passed the Creationism Act, which 
was struck down by the Supreme Court in Edwards v. 
Aguillard.229 
In the Edwards case, the Supreme Court held the 
Creationism Act was unconstitutional on the basis that it 
violated the Lemon test by requiring that creationism be 
                                                 
225 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38 (1985).  
226 Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000).  
227 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
228 Creationism teaches that humans were created by a supreme being 
and did not evolve whereas intelligent design theorizes that nature was 
created by a supreme or intelligent being and was not created by chance.   
229 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
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taught alongside evolution.230 Similarly, in Kitzmiller v. 
Dover Area School District, the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania ruled that a local 
school district that required public school science classes to 
teach intelligent design as an alternative to evolution, violated 
the Establishment Clause because intelligent design is 
essentially religious in nature.231 The decisions in both 
Edwards and Kitzmiller are hostile to religion because they 
prevent alternative theories from being required components 
in public school curriculums simply by virtue of their 
religious implications. On the contrary, if the decisions had 
upheld such requirements this would have been friendly to 
religion as both creationism and intelligent design are 
religious doctrines.   
The polarized outcome of government interaction with 
religion is particularly evident with regard to moral 
considerations. This is true even for moral considerations that 
involve government and religion indirectly and is exemplified 
by the debates surrounding euthanasia, capital punishment, 
abortion, and gay marriage. With regard to euthanasia, in 
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court upheld a 
Washington law proscribing assisted suicide.232 The Supreme 
Court held that assisted suicide was not protected by the Due 
Process Clause.233 While there are several secular 
considerations in support of this decision it is nevertheless 
friendly towards religion because it is consistent with the 
proscription of suicide in many religions. Notwithstanding 
the outcome in this instance, the Supreme Court’s resolution 
of decisive moral issues is not always so favorable to 
religion. For instance, the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of capital punishment despite the fact that 
                                                 
230 Id. at 578-79. The Creationism Act did not mandate that 
creationism or evolution be taught. Rather it specified that if one was to 
be taught the other must be taught alongside it. Id. at 581. 
231 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F.Supp.2d 707 (M.D. Pa 
2005). 
232 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).    
233 Id. at 702. 
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religious authorities almost universally reject it.234 The 
Supreme Court has also held that women have a 
constitutional right to choose to have an abortion.235 
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held 
that homosexuals have a right to marry under the 
Massachusetts State Constitution.236 In all three instances, the 
Court’s decisions are hostile to some religions because the 
tenants of some religions proscribe such practices. For this 
reason, if these issues had been decided the other way around 
they would be friendly towards religion.  
All of the aforementioned practices and decisions 
highlight the fact that government interaction, including 
interaction of an indirect nature, is inherently friendly or 
hostile towards religion. In each of these situations, many 
important governmental and religious interests are at stake 
and a myriad of variables must be considered. In making such 
considerations it is quite difficult to truly divorce oneself 
from personal bias. Further, even if actual impartiality could 
be achieved, it is impossible to fully consider and equally 
balance all aspects of every variable. Most important 
prudence seems to advise against government neutrality 
towards religion. Establishing neutrality as the benchmark in 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, therefore, is both 





                                                 
234 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (ending the 
moratorium on the death penalty that began in Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238 (1972), and reaffirming its constitutionality as it is currently 
employed).  
235 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that most laws against 
abortion violate women’s constitutional right to privacy under the liberty 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
236 Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003) (holding that the state’s constitution “affirms the dignity and 
equality of all individuals” and that with regard to this there is no 
constitutionally adequate reason for denying marriage to same-sex 
couples.  Id. at 948.). 
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V. LEGAL COERCION AND THE PRUDENCE OF 
ADOPTING A NONPREFERENTIALIST APPROACH 
TO GOVERNMENT AID AND INVOLVEMENT WITH 
RELIGION 
 
Jefferson’s wall metaphor and the associated neutrality 
ideal have dominated the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for 
well over forty years. Not all have embraced the two with 
open arms though. Over the past twenty years there has been 
a growing trend in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in 
favor of nonpreferentialism. This section will explain how the 
nonpreferentialist approach is consistent with the intent of the 
Framers and the express language of the Religion Clauses. In 
addition, the views of Alexis de Tocqueville will be 
considered relative to the prudence of adopting a 
nonpreferentialist approach. Finally, a review will be made of 
two important cases that are currently making their way 
through the Federal Court system. These two cases are 
important as they may present the Supreme Court with an 
ideal opportunity to implement nonpreferentialism. The cases 
are also important because implementing nonpreferentialism 
would abolish two longstanding practices that undermine true 
religious liberty.    
 
A. The Nonpreferentialist Approach is Consistent 
with the Intent of the Framers and the Express 
Language of the Religion Clauses 
 
The First Amendment does not mandate neutrality or 
strict separationism. Rather, the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment stipulate, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”237 The Religion Clauses were intended by 
the Framers to prevent the national government from favoring 
a particular religious sect and to prevent a national church or 
religion from being established. The truth of this assertion is 
apparent from the debates of the First Congress surrounding 
                                                 
237 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
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the proposed religion amendment and is reflected throughout 
early government practices in the United States. Former 
Chief Justice Rehnquist states that from such evidence it 
appears “that the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment had acquired a well-accepted meaning: it 
forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade 
preference among religious sects or denominations.”238 
Similarly, Justice Thomas performed an exhaustive survey of 
religion in the revolutionary era and found that “the Framers 
saw the Establishment Clause simply as a prohibition on 
governmental preferences for some religious faiths over 
others.”239 Strong support for this position can be found in 
Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States. Justice Story’s treatise is particularly relevant 
given his prominent role on the Supreme Court during the 
post-revolutionary period.240 As Justice Rehnquist observed 
in Wallace, Justice Story confirms that there was almost 
universal acceptance that religion should “receive 
encouragement from the State so far as [such encouragement] 
was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience 
and the freedom of religious worship.”241  
Both the express language of the Religion Clauses and the 
Framer’s apparent understanding of them are consistent with 
nonpreferentialism. Nonpreferentialism is the view that 
government may not prefer one religion to another religion 
but may support religion in general. Former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas have vigorously endorsed this 
approach.242 Justice Thomas has advocated for the adoption 
                                                 
238 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
239 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
240 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing 
that Story was a Harvard Professor, ascended to the Court in 1811, and 
wrote the first comprehensive treatise on the Constitution).  
241 Id. at 104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Joseph 
Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 630-32 
(5th ed. 1891)). 
242 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring).  See 
also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist J., dissenting). 
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of a “legal coercion” standard, which would put 
nonpreferentialism back into practice.243 Under the legal 
coercion test, the government violates the Establishment 
Clause “when it uses legal means to directly coerce religious 
beliefs”244 This provides a reliable and manageable way of 
enforcing the Establishment Clause, which is consistent with 
both the intent of the Framers and the express language of the 
Constitution.245 The legal coercion test is also friendly 
towards religion because it would allow government to 
provide support for religion. Prudence also dictates that the 
Supreme Court should adopt a friendly approach in its Free 
Exercise jurisprudence. Reinstating Brennan’s strict scrutiny 
standard of review would provide a reliable, manageable, and 
friendly way of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause, which is 
more consistent with the express language of the 
Constitution.     
Still, many Justices on the Supreme Court have responded 
to nonpreferentialism with firm resistance. For instance, 
Justice Souter responded to the overwhelming evidence in 
support of a nonpreferential approach with his concurrence in 
Weisman. In this case, Souter suggests that “[a]lthough 
evidence of historical practice can indeed furnish valuable aid 
in the interpretation of contemporary language”246 acts such 
as inviting a Rabbi to give a speech at a public school 
graduation ceremony “prove only that public officials, no 
matter when they serve, can turn a blind eye to constitutional 
principle.”247  
In view of the religious history of the United States and 
its associated aid and involvement with religion, this 
characterization attempts to establish the exception as the 
                                                 
243 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
244 James A. Campbell, Newdow Calls for a New Day in 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: Justice Thomas’s “Actual Legal 
Coercion” Standard Provides the Necessary Renovation, 39 AKRON L. 
REV. 541, 569 (2006).  
245  Id. at 567-572. 
246 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616 (1992) (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
247 Id. 
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rule. Souter’s argument is flawed because history shows that 
strict separation was the exception and not the rule. The 
overwhelming evidence in support of this conclusion is 
manifest throughout the nation’s history. Surely, if one turns 
a blind eye to our nation’s history, one cannot help but turn a 
blind eye to its constitutional principles in the process. This 
begs the question as to why neutrality and strict 
separationism have enjoyed such prevalence in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence? Historical consistency, fidelity to the 
intent of the Framers, and the express language of the First 
Amendment cannot justify this prevalence. The only apparent 
justification is that separationist proponents believe it is 
advantageous to erect a high and impregnable wall separating 
government and religion. This justification fails because the 
approach intended by the Framers and adopted in practice by 
the government is the more prudent approach. 
   
B. Alexis De Tocqueville and the Prudence of 
Adopting the Nonpreferentialist Approach 
 
Adopting nonpreferentialism is prudent because it is in 
accord with the demonstrated intent of the founding fathers 
and is consistent with the express language of the Religion 
Clauses. The prudence of adopting a nonpreferentialist 
standard is illustrated by three important observations that 
Alexis de Tocqueville made in Democracy in America. By 
virtue of these observations it is clear why Tocqueville fears 
that the “religious spirit” of America may be in jeopardy.248 
This inquiry could not be complete without at least briefly 
discussing the views of Tocqueville, as he is perhaps the most 
famed proponent of maintaining a religious and political 
fellowship in America.  
Tocqueville cautions that a new kind of despotism should 
be feared in democratic nations such as America.249 In 
describing the form of despotism that democratic nations 
ought to fear, Tocqueville describes a “mild” despotism that 
                                                 
248 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Harvey 
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., University of Chicago Press 2000).    
249 Id. at 661-61. 
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is rooted in “general apathy, the fruit of individualism.”250 
Tocqueville fears that such apathy “does not tyrannize, but it 
compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, 
till each nation is reduced to be nothing better than a flock of 
timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the 
shepherd.”251 In turn, Tocqueville hopes that “[r]eligion may 
diminish the threat of mild despotism by reminding citizens 
of the seriousness of life outside the busy search for material 
well-being in democracies.”252 Nonpreferentialism is prudent, 
therefore, because it allows government to support religion 
and religion provides vital protection from mild despotism.  
Tocqueville describes such despotism as being produced 
“in the very shadow of the sovereignty of the people” and as 
consisting of “an innumerable crowd of like and equal men 
who revolve on themselves without repose, procuring the 
small and vulgar pleasure with which they fill their souls.”253 
From this it appears that equality, homogeneity, and 
materialism are three principle components of mild despotism 
and American democracy. Tocqueville indicates that the 
combined effect of these components is to soften and weaken 
individuals—to prevent exceptional individuals from rising 
up from among the crowd.254 Religion is therefore useful as it 
“may serve as a reminder of what transcends the mediocrity 
of democratic public life, and thus of a greatness not usually 
within its scope.”255 Insofar as religion is able to inspire 
greatness, nonpreferentialism is prudent as it allows religion 
to receive support from government.  
Tocqueville also notes, “in the United States religion 
is…intermingled with all natural habits and all the sentiments 
to which a native country gives birth; that gives it particular 
strength.”256 The strength that Tocqueville finds in religion 
                                                 
250  Id. at 704 (emphasis in original).  
251  Id. at 663. 
252 Id. at lxxxii (Introduction of Harvey Mansfield and Delba 
Withrop).   
253  Id. at 663-664. 
254  Id. at 672, 676. 
255 Id. at lxxxiii (Introduction of Harvey Mansfield and Delba 
Withrop).   
256  Id. at 405-06. 
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involves not only its ability to safeguard against the perils of 
mild despotism. Rather, Tocqueville is also cognizant of the 
role of religion in developing and maintaining the morality, 
which is necessary to sustain our form of government.257 In 
fact, Tocqueville thinks that there is an “intimate union of the 
spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom” such that freedom 
“considers religion as the safeguard of mores; and mores as 
the guarantee of laws and the pledge of its own duration.”258  
Tocqueville was not alone in linking religion and morality 
or in finding that the United States is dependent on religious 
morality to maintain security and stability. Many prominent 
Americans, including many of the founding fathers, shared 
such sentiments. For instance, in 1796 during his celebrated 
Farewell Address, George Washington proclaimed, “reason 
and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality 
can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”259 Similarly, 
John Adams stated that our government is not “armed with 
power capable of contending with human passions unbridled 
by morality and religion” and that in their unbridled form 
“[a]vorice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry, would break the 
strongest cords of our Constitution as a whale goes through a 
net.”260 Perhaps surprisingly, it is well established that 
Thomas Jefferson also publicly favored religion over 
irreligion.261 Jefferson thought that the only secure basis for 
preserving liberty was “a conviction in the minds of the 
people that these liberties are of the gift of God.”262  
                                                 
257 Id. at 44, 282-84. 
258 Id. at 27, 44. 
259 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Washington's Farewell 
Address 1796, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm, (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2006). Alexander Hamilton appears to have endorsed this 
same position. This is exemplified by the fact that he included the above-
quoted language in his initial draft of Washington’s Farewell Address.   
260 CHARLES E. RICE, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER 47 
(Fordham University Press 1964) (quoting letter from John Adams to the 
Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of 
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261 Aristide Tessitore, Thomas Jefferson on Legitimate Government, 
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Professor John Koritansky finds that even Thomas Paine, 
the quintessential American radical, “is confident that 
religions in general, the genus religion, is benign.”263 The 
benign nature of religion was also discussed by Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., who said that “[r]eligion operates not only 
on the vertical plane but also on the horizontal...[i]t seeks not 
only to integrate men with God but to integrate men with men 
and each man with himself.”264 Religion as thus understood is 
an important tool in our society. Professor Mansfield remarks 
that if “government is to remain limited, individuals must be 
able to rule themselves, at least to some extent, and to do this, 
religion—which reminds of the importance of our souls—
might seem indispensable.”265 All in all, because morality is a 
necessary component for a stable government and because 
religion produces morality, it is prudent to adopt 
nonpreferentialism as it enables the government to be 
supportive of religion.    
 
C. Important Cases on the Horizon 
 
In 2005 Dr. Michael Newdow brought two important 
cases in Federal Court. Newdow filed the first case pro per 
and as counsel and is again challenging the Constitutionality 
of “under God” in the Pledge.266 This case was filed in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on 
January 3, 2005. District Court Judge Lawrence Karlton ruled 
in favor of Newdow and an appeal was filed in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which has yet to render its decision. 
Newdow brought the second case pro per and is challenging 
the Constitutionality of “IN GOD WE TRUST” on United 
                                                 
263 John Koritansky, Thomas Paine: The American Radical, in 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 75 (Bryan-Paul Frost & 
Jeffery Sikkenga eds., Lexington Books 2003). 
264 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM (Harper & 
Row 1958). 
265 MANSFIELD, supra note 136, at 104. 
266 As mentioned above, Newdow’s previous attempt at challenging 
the pledge failed because the Court decided that he did not have standing 
to sue. See, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 1 
(2004). 
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States currency. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of California on November 18, 2005. 
The District Court granted a motion to dismiss the case and 
an appeal has been filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  
In the event that favorable decisions are obtained in the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, it appears quite likely that the 
cases will end up before the Supreme Court. This will give 
the Supreme Court an excellent opportunity to officially 
adopt nonpreferentialism. Perhaps counter-intuitively, 
adopting such an approach may actually support Newdow’s 
position in both instances. While nonpreferentialism allows 
for government support of religion, it requires that in 
rendering such support preference not be given to one 
religion at the expense of another. Yet including “God” in 
both the Pledge and on all United States currency appears to 
inherently favor monotheistic religions at the expense of non-
monotheistic religions. Such a result is inconsistent with the 
principal tenet of nonpreferentialism. Therefore, if the 
Supreme Court were to strictly apply nonpreferentialism, the 
explicit references to God on our currency and in the Pledge 
would seemingly represent violations of the Establishment 
Clause.  
Some might seek to assert ceremonial deism as a means 
of escaping this conclusion. To adopt nonpreferentialism in 
this instance and immediately thereafter employ ceremonial 
deism would be an unfortunate and unsatisfying result. If 
nonpreferentialism is to maintain its integrity and function 
properly, ceremonial deism must not be allowed to prevent 
government practices from withstanding the scrutiny of an 
objective nonpreferential analysis. Practices that cannot stand 
up to such scrutiny should be held unconstitutional regardless 
of ceremonial legacy. Because memorialized government 
references to “God” prefer religions believing in God they are 
unlikely to withstand such scrutiny. Overt references to 
“God” on United States currency, in the Pledge, and in the 
national motto, favor monotheistic religions at the expense of 
other religions. At bottom, true religious liberty must mean 
the freedom to practice any religion on an equal basis. 
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Favoring one religion over another stifles the freedom to 
practice religion on such a basis.  
This does not mean, however, that government may not 
demonstrate support for religion. Surely, if the currency were 
to state “IN RELIGION WE TRUST” it would not violate the 
Establishment Cause. Also, a strict application of 
nonpreferentialism would allow the government to provide 
nondiscriminatory aid to religious institutions.267 This aid will 
help to strengthen the “genus religion” and will allow the 
government to reap the benefits of its benevolence. For these 
reasons, maintaining the religious references in the currency 
and Pledge undermines fundamental principles of true 
religious liberty.     
                                                 
267 In providing such support it will be necessary to define what 
beliefs and practices merit formal recognition as “official” religions. 
Defining religion as such could become a slippery slope. For this reason 
we must navigate the slippery slope at the outset and define religion in 
such a manner as to prevent misuse and abuse of the term and to facilitate 
protection of the institution.    
